

The Imaginative Eye

Roger Scruton and the Aesthetics of Architecture

Kimmo Lapintie
Department of Architecture
Tampere University of Technology
P.O. Box 527
33101 Tampere
Finland

Summary

The aesthetics of architecture as a field of research suffer from chronic schizophrenia. They are divided into two rather incommensurable parts: one that often contains bright insight into architecture but very little serious analysis, and the other that is the exact opposite with stronger theory but a naive view of its subject.

This situation has had its effects: theoretical discourse is rather rare, compared with the number of polemical writings. One might even doubt the very existence of a field of research called 'the aesthetics of architecture'.

Roger Scruton has, however, written an essay with this title, and it certainly contains an attempt at serious analysis of architecture (Scruton, 1979). Scruton is a philosopher, and he hasn't entirely succeeded in escaping the problems common with such a 'theoretical' background. For him, architecture is the art of individual buildings (and not of the environmental structure as a whole) and even buildings that are looked at (rather than used). Thus his view is rather narrow, even that of a tourist, or a 'lover of architecture'. This attitude is slightly in contrast with his expressed desire to have an "aesthetics of everyday life" (Scruton, 1979, 17).

However, in spite of this 'unprofessional' viewpoint Scruton's theory is by no means irrelevant or uninteresting. The most welcome feature of it is that it is clearly a *philosophical* theory, and thus also subject to philosophical criticism. This criticism will lead us even beyond Scruton's final results. As such, these results seem to end up in a rather strange apology for detail and classicism, as well as objective value in architecture.

The attempt to build an aesthetics of everyday life, and the connection between architecture and morality, are the strongest insights in Scruton's theory. The conclusions he draws from his discussion are, on the other hand, far from warranted.

Scruton's book is extensive, and I only discuss its basic arguments. The purpose of this paper is not only to be a commentary of Scruton's book, but to search the way for a theory of architecture as a total phenomenon. Therefore I concentrate on two distinct but related problems in the text: the definition and the evaluation of architecture.

Résumé

L'esthétique de l'architecture, comme champ de recherche, souffre de schizophrénie chronique. Elle est divisée en deux courants irréconciliables: l'un qui contient des intuitions brillantes sur l'architecture mais très peu d'analyses sérieuses, et l'autre, qui est son exact opposé, développant davantage la partie théorique mais à partir de vues naïves sur l'esthétique.

Cette situation n'est pas sans conséquences: le discours théorique est plutôt rare si on le compare au discours polémique qui foisonne. On en vient presque à douter de l'existence d'un champ de recherche qui s'appellerait «l'esthétique de l'architecture». Roger Scruton a toutefois écrit une étude qui porte ce titre et elle contient certes une tentative d'analyse sérieuse de l'architecture. Scruton est un philosophe et ça se sent: il n'a pas complètement réussi à éviter les écueils liés à un tel bagage «théorique». Pour lui l'architecture est l'art des constructions individuelles (et pas du tout celle d'une structure environnementale considérée comme un tout). Qui plus est, les constructions sont faites pour être regardées, admirées, plus qu'appropriées par les habitants qui y vivent. Sa perspective s'en trouve donc singulièrement rétrécie. C'est un peu celle d'un touriste ou d'un «amoureux de l'architecture». Cette attitude est d'ailleurs en léger désaccord avec son projet explicite de dégager une «esthétique de la vie quotidienne».

Néanmoins, malgré son point de vue «non professionnel», la théorie de Scruton n'est pas dépourvue de pertinence ni d'intérêt. Sa principale qualité est d'être nommément une théorie *philosophique* et de la sorte ouverte à une critique de type philosophique. Cette critique nous conduit au-delà des conclusions de Scruton. Et en tant que tels, ces résultats semblent aboutir, aussi étrange que cela puisse paraître, à une apologie du détail et du classicisme d'une part, et de la valeur objective de l'architecture d'autre part.

La tentative d'élaborer une esthétique de la vie quotidienne et le lien entre architecture et morale sont les intuitions les plus fortes de la théorie de Scruton. Les conclusions qu'il en dégage sont, par ailleurs, loin de faire l'unanimité.

Le livre de Scruton est vaste et je ne m'arrête, dans mon étude, qu'aux arguments de fond. Son but n'est pas seulement d'être un commentaire du livre de Scruton, elle pose aussi les bases pour une théorie de l'architecture comme phénomène global. Je me centre donc sur deux problèmes distincts mais liés dans le texte: la définition de l'architecture et son évaluation.

1. The Definition of Architecture

It is no use to talk of architecture if we don't know what we are talking about. In a theoretical analysis of architecture an explicit definition is even necessary, since many of the common disputes may be results from mere conceptual confusions.

The difficulty of finding such a definition is easily illustrated. Suppose we define architecture simply as the art of building. The first reflection reveals the polysemic nature of this expression: by 'art' we may refer either to the skill of doing something (the art of skiing, the art of cooking) or to the 'pure' arts like music, literature, and painting. Which of these two meanings are we referring to in the case of architecture? Or to both of them? Or are they connected in this case?

A second question is equally obvious. By architecture we don't only mean the activity of designing buildings but also the results of this activity. But what kind of results? The individual buildings or the environmental structure as a whole? And how about the possible normative content of 'architecture'? Are all buildings, or only the successful ones, to be considered architecture? That is, can we distinguish architecture from mere building?

This conceptual confusion is partly due to our slightly different but parallel theoretical traditions. Architecture is generally admitted the status of an art, in the same sense that painting and sculpture have it. In the traditional history of art architecture is always combined with these 'pure' visual arts, and it is thus placed even above (or beyond) the other applied visual arts, like handicraft and industrial design.

This seems to suggest that whatever is the definition of 'art' (in the not-only-skill sense of the word), it must surely include architecture in its extension. Otherwise we would have a contrary-to-usage definition, which would certainly need a powerful philosophical justification.

This fact makes architecture a rather puzzling 'detail' for philosophical aesthetics. Unlike the 'pure' arts, architecture is essentially a social and political art, and any theory based on the individual meaning of art is bound to find architecture a strange art indeed, even a counter-example. For instance, it would be simply foolish to say that architecture is an expression of the architect's feelings.

The modern theories that see art as a kind of communication have also won support in theories of architecture, but even here we face enormous problems: architecture as an abstract, slow and expensive art may be communication only in a very extended sense.¹

But at the same time as this art-historical tradition places architecture among the 'pure' visual arts, it also implies a rather curious view of architecture as an art of individual buildings, and not just any buildings, but the *great* ones. This tradition has only very slowly been weakened by the independent studies of the history of the city and of vernacular architecture (Korn, 1953; Mumford, 1961; Curl, 1970; Benevolo, 1975; Camesasca, 1968).

The traditional view of architecture is, however, hardly acceptable from the point of view of professional design (with the exception of narrow-minded professionals). The principles of architectural design and evaluation are equally suitable for the city and the vernacular structure as they are for the 'great buildings'. What is more, any profound analysis of an individual building requires reference to its surroundings. Thus the whole idea of an *individual* building is in fact a false abstraction made by the art-historians; being at a specific urban or rural structure (and not abstractly on the pages of history books) is an essential feature of any building.

Scruton doesn't present us with an exact definition of architecture, but he notices its special features, namely its political or social character (Scruton, 1979, 15) and its applied and even vernacular nature (Scruton 1979, 16-17). However, he seems to be stuck with a version of the above mentioned art-historical view, and from that position he proceeds to attack the traditional theories of architecture, as well as to defend his own theory of its essence.

In order to bring this essential confrontation out into the open I shall consider

1. In chapter 7, Scruton (1979) criticizes the popular communicative theories, with justification.

and defend a definition which seems to me the exact opposite of the traditional art-historical view. This is given by Giovanni Fanelli in his article 'L'architettura' (Buzzoni, A., Di Benedetto, G., *et al.*, 1979). According to him, architecture is "a structural configuration of a space for human life" ("una struttura che configura uno spazio di vita umana").

This definition has three parts, (1) that architecture is a *structure*, (2) that its aim is the configuration of *space*, (3) that this space is for *human life*. By "struttura" Fanelli naturally doesn't mean the engineer's structure, but rather the structure of theoretical structuralism. In this case it would mean the total order of the environment (including detailing as well as macro-structures). And it should be noted that to Fanelli architecture is "una struttura", not a set of independent structures. Thus we should, on this interpretation, treat the whole world as an enormous work of architecture, changing all the time due to the minor efforts of individual architects, builders, and other people responsible for human settlements.

Scruton doesn't deny this. In fact he writes that

"buildings constitute important features of their own environment, as their environment is an important feature of them" (Scruton, 1979, 10).

However, literally every one of his 90 illustrated examples (with the partial exception of Piazza di Campidoglio) is a building, or a part of a building. Nowhere in the text does he make any important reference to a total environmental structure, and in the end he devotes a whole chapter to underline the importance of detail.

This evident inconsistency is not surprising, however, since it reflects a rather common attitude. It is widely agreed that buildings are connected with their environment in a very special way, but it is not so easy to say what this connection is. It is thus clear that histories of art with their emphasis on individual artists and works of art hardly pay any attention to this connection.

But let us go on. The second part of Fanelli's definition asserts that the architectural structure is essentially a means to an end, and that this end is a spatial configuration.² In other words, the essence of architecture is the formation of space, and that this essentiality is based on a means-ends relation.

This position, so popular in the 'theories' of the Modern Movement, is something which Scruton sets out to refute. His arguments on this point are important, if only because they help us to get closer to the meaning of 'architectural space'. This meaning is, surely, less than crystal-clear.³

Consider the following straightforward attack:

"Taken literally, the theory that the experience of architecture is an experience of space is obviously indefensible. If space were all that interested us, then not only must a large part of the architect's activity seem like so much useless decoration, but it is even difficult to see why he should bother to build at all. If I stand in an open field then I can have a full experience of all the separate spaces that are enclosed in St. Peter's in Rome. The only difference is that here the shell which Bramante and Michelangelo constructed around those spaces does not exist, and so does not interfere with the pure unmediated contemplation of the spaces as they are in themselves." (Scruton, 1979, 43)

2. Fanelli doesn't analyse his definition in his article, and if my interpretations are not exactly faithful, they may be taken as a further elaboration of Fanelli's original idea.

3. I have discussed these conceptual difficulties in more detail in my article "A Theory of Space; Towards a Pure Phenomenology of Architecture", DATUTOP 9, 1985.

The question, however, is not whether we should take the theory of space literally or not, but whether we can use any everyday meaning of the word 'space'. If we understand with 'space' anything like 'volume of air' or 'void of a certain form', we shall immediately see (as Scruton did) that space is far from essential in architecture. But the point is really that space in architecture is something quite different.

This conceptual shift from everyday usage does not, however, mean an *ad hoc* attempt to save the theory of architecture as space. It is rather based on the fact that for architects 'space' has always meant something else than for other people.

In the above quotation Scruton is clearly identifying 'space' with 'void of a certain form'. After this "literal" interpretation it is easy to show that architecture cannot consist of creating voids of certain forms, since all these voids are already available for the man standing in an open field — where there is no architecture.

This "literal" definition has hardly ever been introduced by architects themselves — a clear mark of its inadequacy. However, many of them have proposed a modified version of it, according to which space in architecture is a physically enclosed void. Thus the man in an open field may have some kind of space around him — due to the enormous vault of the sky — but he certainly doesn't have the spaces of St. Peter's of Rome, since he lacks the necessary enclosure.

There are certainly some ontological difficulties with this definition (for what are we actually referring to with this "enclosure", the void, the combination of void and material, or what?) but we may set these problems aside now and see what Scruton has to say about space defined in this way:

"-- it certainly does not capture all that is interesting in St. Paul's, where, despite the 'spatial' grandeur, we have also deliberate and impressive effects of light and shade, of ornament, texture and mouldings." (Scruton, 1979, 44)

But this common sense argument immediately calls for an objection. As has been seen above, the possible essentiality of space is due to its status as the *end* (and not the *whole*) of architectural expression. So the mere existence of architectural details is no argument by itself, but only if we can show that they are not means to spatial ends.

Scruton is full aware of this counter-argument, and also of the many ways in which details *can* be means to spatial ends:

"Thus one might be led to think of an interior cornice as having an architectural (as opposed to a merely functional) interest because it brings the space of the wall to an effective conclusion, and defines thereby the hidden geometry of the roof cavity: as in the interior of St. Peter's, which we come therefore to see as rectangular box upon which rests a long half-cylinder of illuminated space — and here too the lights can be seen as enhancing that very same spatial division. By contrast, the relatively unemphatic string courses which divide the wall-space of a northern Gothic cathedral serve only, as it were, to rest the eye on its upward movement, and do not truly divide the interior space --". (Scruton, 1979, 44)

Now it is clear that if the above argument is going to have any force, we must change our definition of architectural space. Expressions like "brings the space of the wall to an effective conclusion" or "serve -- to rest the eye on its upward movement" make no sense if we are only talking about spatial enclosure. Surely the space that Scruton is implicitly referring to is *space as an experience*. At the same time it becomes clear that this meaning reflects much better the tacit meaning that is attached to 'space' among architects. A rough example will do to show this. I sup-

pose that every architect agrees that the space of a black room is changed dramatically if it is painted white. However, the 'enclosure' is not changed in any way, only the experience.

But granted that this is a proper 'definition' of architectural space (in the sense that it correctly describes its ontological nature) the original theory of the essentiality of architectural space can be falsified by showing that there are important features of architecture which cannot be seen as means to spatial ends, even if we define space as an experience.

Scruton finds two such features, the effect of materials, and the distinction between carved and modelled forms (he also proposes statuary as a counter-example, but I don't see the point of that argument).

It seems to me that these are real counter-examples, but, again, only on a rather narrow interpretation of architectural space. It is true that right here we are losing sight of all the common sense conceptions of space, but there are strong theoretical reasons for extending, once more, our definition of architectural space.

Traditionally, the theory of space and the theory of *place* have been somewhat separated. This distinction is not theoretical, however, but rather historical (Van de Ven, 1978-1980), and there is every reason to work for a combination of the two. Clearly a place is always in a space, and the distinguishing feature of a space is its topological character (from *topos*, place).

But as we start considering the *experiences* of place and space, the situation becomes somewhat more complicated. Much of architecture is, in a way, 'making places'. This happens by creating *unique characteristics* for the structural unit in question (room, building, square, city etc.). When one is standing in front of St. Peter's or the Pantheon there is a strong feeling of 'being somewhere', at a very specific place. This feeling, often romantically called *Genius Loci*, has two important features: uniqueness and a specific character of place. Part of the feeling consists of the mere feeling that one *is at a certain place* (and not lost, not *anywhere*). The other part of the feeling gives the place its specific nature, which consists of references to other places, or to parts of the total space. I shall return to this idea presently.

The designer may, thus, create a unique place enabling people to identify their location. But he may also do the reverse. He may repeat a certain form many times, as well as use a form or a structure that has been used in countless other places. These features naturally disturb identification, but not only that. They are important means to *modify* space. If the architect creates a form that already exists at another place, he in a way *identifies two distinct places*. The purpose of this is not necessarily to fool people, but to help them restructure their own private spaces.



Consider, as an example, an ordinary church. There are always some features that make it unique, thus enabling one to distinguish it from its surroundings, as well as from other churches. But there are also many features that are sufficiently similar in other churches. The different churches are, in a way, *identified* by these common features. This fact ensures that being in a church is not only being at a specific place, but also *being in church*, as in an abstract place.

For the architect, thus, space is not given, as it is for the engineer and the economist, but it is subject to continuous modulation. This is because the architect is not creating an outer but an inner space.

Having this extended theory of architectural space as the background we may

now attack Scruton's two counter-examples. In the first place, it is evident that the building materials *do* make a difference. If a building made of grey sandstone were instead made of steel or concrete, it would be quite another building, even if the *form* were just the same.

But *what* could this difference be? What is the difference between, say, stone and steel? Clearly they have completely different *references*, they are *associated* with different things. Stone reminds us of the earth where it is from. It is heavy and hard, and thus it represents the eternity of the earth and the mountains. There are differ-



(Sources: Werner Blaser: *The Rock is My Home*, WEMA-Verlag, Zürich, 1976, and Heinrich Engel: *Structure Systems*, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1967.)

Fig. 1+2. What is the difference between stone and steel? Stone reminds us of the earth where it is from. It is heavy and hard, and thus it represents the eternity of the earth and the mountains. There are different kinds of stone, and therefore it also refers to the part of land where that kind is typical. Steel, on the other hand, has very different references. It is not directly from the earth, and thus it carries a strong reference to *man* and his technology. Cars, machines, planes, rockets, all the moving vehicles are made of steel and metal, and thus it clearly has a reference to movement and freedom.

ent kinds of stone, and therefore it also refers to the part of land where that kind is typical. It is organic, though not in the same way as growing materials like wood, and thus it also refers to nature in general.

The reference to the earth is a reference to the basic up-down dimension of orientation. The aspect of eternity is clearly a place-making feature, since only fixed characteristics are respectable 'landmarks'; if the structure has an air of change, its formal characteristics will not be trusted. The actual landmarks are themselves often made of stone.

Apart from these place-making characteristics of stone, it also has references outside its actual place and time. It is an old material, and thus it connects us with ancient times and buildings. It is also a material from nature, and it can be found anywhere. Thus it gives the feeling of 'being in nature', which is not being at a specific place. Its type may remind us of a larger area, perhaps our country or our home district, where this type of stone is typical.

Steel, on the other hand, has very different references. It is not directly from the earth, and thus it carries a strong reference to *man* and his technology. Cars, machines, planes, rockets, all the moving vehicles are made of steel or metal, and thus it clearly has a reference to movement and freedom. Although it is hard, it can be moulded, and it can take practically any form. A steel structure seems to be equally well at home in outer space as it is on earth, and so it gives no aid in our up-down orientation. In almost all aspects steel is *not* a place-making material, but rather it emphasizes abstract freedom and movement in space.

So it seems that the apparently distinct features of the building materials can all be explained as essentially *spatial* features, if only the concept of space is understood in the manner I introduced above. These interpretations may sound rather daring and questionable, but it should be remembered that their purpose is not to salvage the space-as-essence theory by way of an *ad hoc* process (for who really cares what is *called* the essence of architecture?). Rather they have an independent aim: to collect the different features of architecture under one general theory. It seems to me that the theory of architectural (or phenomenal) space is the only one that could do the job. It is, of course, possible to talk of materials, embellishment, form, space, etc. as distinct parts of architecture (as most textbooks do), but it would be foolish to assume that they are *independent* in the total environmental structure. The idea in the extended theory of architectural space is to describe and explain their interdependence, under one theoretical model.

The same technique can be easily used to explain the evident difference between carved and modelled forms. Carving is certainly an activity that can be performed only in an existing, firm structure, like a rock or a mountain. A carved space is like a cave, and its place-making references are thus very strong (it is not possible to move a cave to another place).

Figure 3

Fig. 3. Every one of us, with normal eyesight, can see that the diagram consists of a set of distinct, unconnected points. However, although we so see them (and consequently also believe in it) we also tend to see them as one object, a straight line. As Scruton describes it, "we see it as we know it not to be".

A modelled structure is much more a built structure, made by man and possibly destroyed by him in the future. It is more flexible but also more fragile than the 'cave', which reminds us of the time when no architecture yet existed (I shall not enter into the problem of space-time here, suffice it to say that space and time are in many ways inseparable in architectural contexts).

We have now travelled through parts (1) and (2) of Fanelli's definition, and we still have the third part left. According to this, the spatial configuration of architecture is meant for human life, it *is* (to be more exact) a configuration *of* this life (*una struttura di vita umana*). At first sight this seems rather self-evident, since architecture is naturally made for human beings. What is important, however, is not what *is* there in the statement, but what is *missing*.


Fanelli doesn't mention the *experience* of architecture, nothing that would refer to *seeing* or *enjoying* buildings and towns. His definition is essentially *anti-touristic*. What is most important to a tourist — or an architect *visiting* buildings and towns — is left entirely out of the definition of architecture.

This position is interesting because it implicitly denies what is taken for granted by Scruton and many others: that the meaning, the end-point of architecture is an experience in the eyes and mind of the receiver. Architecture, it is thought, is a visual art, and it therefore aims at this (at least mainly) visual effect. Without it there would be no architecture, as there can be no painting for the blind and no music for the deaf.

From this assumption Scruton sets out to search for the essence of architecture in the *experience* of it. Having found a (to him) satisfactory account of this experience, or rather this seeing, he seems to be content: he has gone far enough.

To Fanelli, on the other hand, the situation is totally different. The end-point of architecture is *human life*, and this is something much more than an 'experience' (however cultivated) of a 'receiver'. The occasional visitors and 'lovers of architec-

Figure 4



(Source: Doreen Yarwood: *The Architecture of Europe*, Batsford, London, 1974.)

Fig. 4. Architecture, as part of our environment, is also seen imaginatively. To take an example from Scruton, the capitals of the columns in an Early Christian basilica are easily seen as a "broken entablature", that is, as two lines pointing toward the altar, thus giving it an additional emphasis.

ture' are, in the end, only curiosities, the real life being something far from looking at buildings and townscapes. It is cooking, sleeping, going to school, going to work, working, coming from work, having fun, making love, having children, dying.

In fact Fanelli is doing something that Scruton is only aiming at, that is, building "an aesthetics of everyday life". But is this position at all defensible? Can we understand architecture without the concept of seeing?

In fact Fanelli's position doesn't go that far. The idea of taking human life (and not experience) as the meaning of architecture is only to suggest that the visual features of architecture are not ends but only means. The central position of visual effect, however, is evident, since our way of interacting with our environment is dominated by our sight.

But, in a way, this position is revolutionary, as compared with the traditional view. It may even suggest that it is not reasonable to call architecture a visual art, since moving, hearing, touching, etc. are all integral parts of the architectural experience.

Roger Scruton's theory, as I mentioned above, starts in the *eye*. However, it ends up in morality, a highly social concept. So it is possible that, by following him, we may be able to return to this confrontation and see where it can lead us.

2. The Morality of Imaginative Perception

What is the essence of an architectural experience? To understand this, we must know something about aesthetic experience in general, at least that experience which is basically dependent on perception (like that of painting, sculpture and music). According to Scruton, the key word here is *imagination*⁴. He introduces it first in music:

"When I hear a note I hear a sound that is pregnant with musical meaning: it suggests harmony, melody, movement. Consider the most basic of these, the phenomenon of musical movement. If I hear two notes, say middle C followed by the A above, then what I hear, speaking literally, is two pitched sounds, separated by the interval of a major sixth. That literal description may equally characterize the experience of a bird. Unlike the bird, however, I may also hear a movement from C to A. Something begins at the first note and rises upward to the second. If I could not hear such movement, then I would be deaf to music." (Scruton, 1979, 81)

We may pass the alleged contrast between human and animal perception, since it is both unwarranted and irrelevant.⁵ The observation of imaginative hearing is, however, an interesting point of departure. As Scruton notes, this hearing must be distinguished from false 'hearing', as when I hear a strange voice and mistakenly take it to be a burglar. The difference lies in the fact that in false hearing there is always a false belief connected with it (e.g. the belief that there is a burglar), whereas in imaginative perception no such false belief is needed. I don't believe that any-


4. This is the key word in Scruton's general theory of art, see his "Art and Imagination", London, 1974.

5. It is clear that the perception of the 'movement' can be observed only by introspection and by asking other people about their experience. Neither of these methods is available if we want to study the experience of animals, and thus there is no ground for any comparison, in a scientific sense. However, we need not give any special status for the human being in order to admit him the ability of imaginative perception.


thing really goes up, I sincerely believe that there are two distinct notes, but *still* I hear or imagine that something moves, ascends from C to A.

The same clearly applies to visual arts. Consider the set of points in Figure 3. Every one of us, with normal eyesight, can see that the diagram consists of a set of distinct, unconnected points. However, although we so see them (and consequently also believe in it), we also tend to see them as one object, a straight line. This, being a case of contrary-to-fact seeing, is also a case of imaginative perception. As Scruton describes it, “we see it as we know it not to be” (Scruton, 1979, 84).


Figure 5




5a




5b




5c



5d



5e



5f




Fig. 5. According to Scruton imaginative perception is free. But consider Figure 5. How could we see this imaginatively? There is clearly one pattern that is – to use Scruton’s expression – *demanding* (5a), others that are possible but no so obvious (5b and 5c), some that are hardly possible (5d and 5e), and many that are clearly impossible (5f for one).

This faculty of imaginative perception is, it seems to me, not only essential to the arts but also to our perception as a whole.⁶ Our visual environment, for instance, is so full of details (which we know to be true) that seeing this environment every moment in all its richness would make it impossible for us to get along with it. We have to abstract, make it simpler, by using different visual models. Thus a tree is seen as a ball, a road as a straight line, a field as a plane. We know that they are not as simple as these geometric models, but this imaginative seeing will make it easier for us to get a quick picture of our environment.

Architecture, as a part of our environment, is naturally also seen imaginatively. To take an example from Scruton, the capitals of the columns in an Early Christian basilica are easily seen as a 'broken entablature', that is, as two lines pointing towards the altar (see Figure 4), thus giving it an additional emphasis.

But what can we say about this imaginative perception? According to Scruton, it is completely *free*, not in any way determined by the physical object of perception, consequently there are many different, often contradictory ways of seeing the same object. However, he says, we cannot see the same object at the same time in two contradictory ways. Thirdly, there is among these ways of seeing a *correct* one, reflecting the true meaning of the object in question.

The first two of these theses are, so I shall argue, clearly false. The third one is possibly true, but despite (or because of) its importance it is left disturbingly ambiguous in Scruton's text.

But let us start with freedom:

"-- Being imaginative, our perception is also free: for it is subordinate to patterns of thought and attention that we are in no way compelled by what we see to engage in." (Scruton, 1979, 84)

This is clearly not true. Consider Figure 5. How could we see this imaginatively? There is clearly one pattern that is -- to use Scruton's expression -- *demanding* (5a), others that are possible but not so obvious (5b and 5c), some that are hardly possible (5d and 5e) and many that are clearly impossible (5f for one).

So it seems that there is an obvious hierarchy between the possible patterns of perception, and that *not just any pattern* will do. The fact that there may be inherently inconsistent ways of seeing the same thing (as there clearly is in seeing the diagram in Figure 5, which admits the different patterns from 5a to 5c, at least) doesn't mean that we might perceive things in *any* way. It is no use even *trying* to see 5 as 5f.

There is, in fact, something wrong with the whole epistemology behind the last quoted passage. It must be remembered that we are now talking about imaginative *perception*, not *pure imagination*. Unlike pure imagination, perception (be it imaginative or not) can never be independent of the physical object that is its cause (unless we take the solipsist position, which Scruton is clearly not suggesting). Even though imaginative perception is "subordinate to" patterns of thought, the patterns do not create the perception. We are, of course, free to *imagine* whatever we like. I may imagine that my house is an enormous castle, but this act has nothing to do with perception.

6. This is a further reason why I strongly doubt Scruton's claim that animals are incapable of imaginative perception.


Figure 6

Fig. 6. The ancient hunter had to be able to distinguish “a rabbit from a duck”, and this ability is equally important for modern man. An identification is essentially picking up the right interpretation. An identification is either right or wrong. If it is a rabbit then it cannot be a duck, and vice versa.

It is part of the basic skill of a visual artist to know these possible patterns of perception and their inherent hierarchy. If he wants, he may even *force* us to see things in a certain way, so that if there is any freedom, it is left for the blind.

But let us now consider the second thesis. Scruton observes that there is a certain parallelism between the patterns of perception and the famous ‘Gestalts’ of Gestalt psychologists. As we remember, Figure 6 may be seen either as a duck or as a rabbit, but only one at a time.

Compare it with a detail from Palazzo Pisani-Moretta (Fig. 7). This may also be seen in two different ways: a row of columns connected with pointed arches, or two overlapping rows connected with semi-circled arches. According to Scruton we are not able to see these two ‘interpretations’ simultaneously, although we may continuously shift from one to the other.

It seems to me that this is not so obvious. Although I perhaps cannot *direct my attention* to both of these patterns at the same time, I certainly can and do see them simultaneously. The other feasible pattern doesn’t *disappear* when I concentrate on the other, in the same way as the rabbit disappears to give way to the duck.

There is, namely, an important difference between the Gestalt tricks and Palazzo Pisani-Moretta. My interpretation of Fig. 6 is directly connected with the important practical problem of *identification*. The ancient hunter had to be able to distinguish ‘a rabbit from a duck’, and this ability is equally important for modern man. But what does this identification consist of? It is essentially *picking up the right interpretation*. An identification is either right or wrong. If it is a rabbit then it *cannot* be a duck, and vice versa.


Figure 7

Fig. 7. Detail from Palazzo Pisani-Moretta, Venice.


The Gestalt puzzle is so close to this real-life problem that it is not surprising that the alternative interpretations exclude each other. However, in the Palazzo case no identification is called for. We already know what it is, viz. a detail of a building. So there is nothing preventing us from seeing both patterns at the same time. I find no difficulty in it, and I can thus volunteer for a counter-example.

Sincerely speaking, I even think that the inherent ambiguity of experience is an important part of architecture as an art. Our ability to see the same object under two inconsistent interpretations at the same time is a *dynamic* aspect of our experience, and consequently it can be used to create intensive, dynamic art.

However, I do not intend to demonstrate this point, since it would depend much on the way I see architecture, and this way seems to be somewhat different from Scruton's view.

An example will illustrate this. The combination of half-columns and the wall between in Roman architecture can, according to Scruton, be seen in two different ways: either as a wall with vertical decoration (this is how Alberti saw it both in his Treatise and his design of Palazzo Rucellai) or as an independent structure of columns, where the wall is only a fill-in between them. Scruton thinks that the latter interpretation is right, and this is where I think he is wrong. In a typical Roman construction, like the Flavian amphitheatre (Fig. 8), there is clearly a co-operation between these two visual patterns: if you imagine the wall gone, the columnar structure loses its stability. So I would rather say that neither of the 'interpretations' is right, or that they are both right.

This will lead us directly to the next, and the most difficult question. According to Scruton, it is possible to achieve both objective appreciation and objective evaluation of architecture. In other words, there is *the right way of seeing* buildings and *the right way of building*. It is important to keep these two theses separate, although they tend to get confused in Scruton's text. As I said before, the first thesis



(Source: Doreen Yarwood, *op. cit.*)

Fig. 8. In a typical Roman construction, like the Flavian amphitheatre, there is clearly a co-operation between two visual patterns: if you imagine the wall gone, the columnar structure loses its stability. Thus it appears right to say that in Roman architecture the combination of half-columns and the wall between can be seen *both* as a wall with vertical decoration and as an independent structure of columns. Neither of the 'interpretations' is *the right one*.

seems to me possibly true, but I haven't found any respectable argument for it from Scruton. The second thesis, on the other hand, seems to me patently false. I shall try to argue, in this and the following chapters, why this is so.

It must be noted that even if I were right in my thesis that the inherent inconsistency of experience is an important 'tool' for the architect, this would not exclude the possibility of a correct interpretation. It would only mean that this inconsistency must be accepted as part of the correct interpretation. In this case it would make no sense to try to find a 'harmonious' solution where all the inconsistencies are solved.

But how about the idea of a correct critical interpretation? Can we argue for it? Scruton approaches it rather loosely:

"[W]hat becomes of the objectivity of taste? How can there be a *valid* critical judgement, when every rule or standard seems beset by the same liability to endless qualifications? It is not enough to say that it is all subjective, and that 'right' and 'wrong' are simply out of place. -- Indeed, it is precisely because of the intellectual complexity of taste and its deep connection with all the preferences that most matter to us, that we seem condemned to pursue an ideal of objectivity even in the face of the most persistent disappointment. Our pleasure in a building therefore incorporates a sense of its own validity, and seems to possess, on that account, a quasi-scientific aspect. We are drawn into a quest for standards, and when, as may happen, a building strikes us as truly beautiful, or truly hideous, it is impossible at one and the same time both to experience it and to believe that our feeling might be wrongly based. A man feels that he has reason for his preference, even when he can *give* no reason; and here, to have reason is to have a right. It is to believe that others ought to share in or at least acknowledge what one feels; if they do not do so, then they must be blind, insensitive, misled." (Scruton, 1979, 132)

Now I would like to believe that there really is some objectivity in our interpretations of architecture, at least at some level. However, I don't know of any argument for this belief, and nor, it seems, does Scruton. The mere fact that people *feel* that they have a right in their preference, that they feel that other people should share their interpretations and evaluations, is no argument. In fact people have the same feelings about their moral, religious and political ideas, their chosen ways of life, even their prejudices. And I am sure that in *this* case they have *no right* whatsoever to expect that other people should share their prejudices.

But perhaps the crucial point of disagreement lies right here. Somehow it seems that Scruton *does* believe that there is a right way of life and a right *Weltanschauung*. He, at least, clearly shares the traditional view of moral philosophy that has for centuries asserted that there are 'right' moral beliefs and that it is possible to 'argue' for them. This is perhaps why he tends to confuse right interpretation with right building, as if it would not be possible to have the first without the second.

So it is perhaps better to set aside the problem of the right interpretation and go straight to the main point, the morality of architecture:

"Our preference means something more to us than mere pleasure or satisfaction. It is the outcome of thought and education; it is expressive of moral, religious and political feelings, of an entire *Weltanschauung*, with which our identity is mingled. Our deepest convictions seek confirmation in the experience of architecture, and it is simply not open to us to dismiss these convictions as matters of arbitrary preference about which others are free to make up their minds, any more than it is open to us to think the same of our feelings about murder, rape or genocide. Just as in matters of morality, and matters of science, we cannot engage in aesthetic argument without feeling that our opponent is wrong." (Scruton, 1979, 105)

Now what is this? There is, certainly, something deeply true in these words. Our preference in architecture is not a matter of 'pleasure', in the crudest sense of the word, but a matter that is dependent (among others) on our moral, political and religious convictions. And we often feel that our opponents with different opinions on these matters are wrong. But does this mean that there is a *right* set of moral beliefs, right politics, and a right religion? Definitely not!

But how is it that Scruton seems to be led to this inconceivable conclusion? One source for this fallacy is obvious: like many contemporary moral philosophers, Scruton deals with the basic moral problems under the dichotomy *subjectivism vs. objectivism* (Scruton, 1979, 237). In the traditional way he argues that since moral, political, religious, aesthetic, etc. ideas are not subjective, they must be objective in some sense.

This argument is fallacious simply because it forgets the third alternative, *relativism*. According to this, moral, political, religious, aesthetic, etc. ideas are justifiable only with respect to a given social group, culture, and time. That is, they are *socially* justifiable, but not in any way objective or absolute.

This position is in fact as old as philosophy itself⁷, but, strangely enough, there are very few serious attempts to analyse it with respect to its rivals. Very often, relativism is simply forgotten, and the obvious impossibility of subjectivism is used as an argument for objectivism or absolutism.

This is, I suppose, how we should understand Scruton's way of thinking. His reluctance to give architectural experience the status that characterizes our tastes in food and wine leads him to conclude that in aesthetics, where it is possible to give reasons for one's preference, an objective judgement must be possible.

But if we do *not* forget relativism, we shall see immediately that the non-subjectivist nature of moral, political and religious ideas is no problem. They are all essentially social phenomena, part of our social ideology, and consequently it is most natural to assume that they have a *relative* value. And since, as Scruton observes, our evaluation of architecture is dependent on these ideological beliefs, it is itself relative, not objective.

I shall not argue for relativism in this context, I only want to show that its mere existence as a possibility is enough to destroy Scruton's argument, or rather his intuition.

There is, however, another argument that Scruton puts forward for his objectivist position. It derives from Hegel's idealistic theory of the self:

"According to the Hegelian theory self-knowledge, far from being the effect of private introspection, is in fact a form of publicly accessible activity, the activity of creating and engaging in a public world, and of coming to experience oneself as part of such a world, as one rational being among many. -- Happiness requires, therefore, the realization of the self; and, if the Hegelian view is correct, self-realization is possible only in a world which bears the marks of human action." (Scruton, 1979, 244)

This is straightforwardly applied to architecture:

"Self-realization requires then that the agent have some real sense, in the present, of his continuity into the future. -- In the idealist view, art, and the aesthetic impulse, play an

7. In many contexts, e.g. in "Protagoras" and in the "Republic" Plato confronts himself with the relativism of the sophists.

important part in the process of 'spreading oneself' on the objective world. The view gains support from our reflections on the art of building. The process of 'self-realization', of breaking from the prison of immediate desire, is a kind of passage from subject to object, a making public and objective of what is otherwise private and confused. But a man can set his feet on the ladder of self-realization only when he has some perception of its reliability, and this cannot be achieved by subjective fiat. He must find himself at home in the world, with values and ambitions that are shared." (Scruton, 1979, 247)

There is something profoundly true in the above passage, and it seems to me that the applied Hegelian theory may be a very useful device in an attempt to characterize the social nature of architecture. However, it is again clear that the absence of relativism is leading Scruton directly from the subjective to the objective.⁸ In fact, he even seems to use the term 'objective' as a synonym for 'public' and 'social'. As such, this is clearly an argument for aesthetic relativism, not objectivism. It is essentially a shift from the subject to the realm of public, shared values.

As if by mistake, the first sentence of the above quotation leads us, however, even further than this. What does it mean to have "some real sense, in the present, of one's continuity into the future"? This will directly bring us to the problem of the architectural *avant-garde*, or architecture as making of the future. Before this, however, a short digression from our main line of thought is in order.

3. The Marxist Challenge

In his essay Roger Scruton discusses two critical theories of architectural aesthetics which he calls "explanatory": Freudianism and Marxism. They are explanatory in the sense that they both try to 'explain' the aesthetic experience by reference to its *genesis* (psycho-historical with Freudians and socio-historical with Marxists). Both of them are considered irrelevant by Scruton, as probably any other explanatory theory would be.

In an important respect, however, the Marxist challenge goes beyond the Freudian. They are both explanatory, it is true, but Marxism includes something more, namely functionality. From the Marxist viewpoint, architecture becomes a tool in the hands of the ruling class. This interpretation, if true, is of the utmost importance for any theory of the evaluation of architecture. For this reason, and because it will bring an alternative view of morality into our discussion, I think that the Marxist challenge deserves a closer look.

One might object — on behalf of the Freudians — that the psychoanalytic theory is also essential to the evaluation of architecture. According to it, architecture should be seen as a kind of therapy, and its success would thereby become dependent on its therapeutic value.

This point of view is, however, confused. It is a matter of fact that architecture is *not* a kind of therapy (it is not intended as such), and viewing it in that way would be proposing for it a *new* social function. According to Marxism, on the other hand, architecture and the evaluation of architecture *already have* a social function that is

8. There is a possibility of conceptual confusion here, since for Hegel 'objective' and 'absolute' are not synonyms, and what is normally called relative would have been called objective by him. A similar idea is perhaps implicit in Scruton's text. Cf. Hegel: "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts", Frankfurt am Main — Berlin — Wien, 1972.

highly relevant, if often ignored. And what is more, this theory also interprets our traditional attempts to find 'objective' aesthetic laws as a social phenomenon called 'mystification'.

But let us try to formulate this thesis somewhat more precisely. The key words are naturally *superstructure* and *ideology*. According to Marx, the course of history is determined by the forces and the modes of production. In pre-socialist phases this means exploitation and class-struggle. The economic 'base' is reflected in the 'superstructure' consisting of the state and all the 'ideological machineries of the state' (Althusser, 1970), that is, religion, education, communication, science, art, etc. The social function of the 'superstructure' is to maintain the established order (that is, the power of the ruling class). According to Althusser, this is also tantamount to a reproductive function, the making of new generations of loyal citizens (Althusser, 1970).

Ideology is the product of these 'ideological machineries'. The ideology of the ruling class is *established* in the social structure, and being established it has also become invisible. It is part of the ideology of the ruling class *that there is no ideology*. In art and architecture, this means aestheticism; what is considered as beautiful has a covert social meaning.

It is important for the established ideology, thus, to hide its own 'historical' nature. It is trying to look as if it were eternal, objective, perhaps divine. In any way, not subject to human action and its historical determinants. This process is called *mystification*.

Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that this form of historical and social determinism is true. One may now object that, purely logically, this does not mean that there cannot be any objective rules of art. Even if the practice and the theory of architecture were in the hands of the ruling class, there may still be objective aesthetic principles, and they may be the very same principles that have this ideological function.

This is true, of course, but *only* purely logically. There is no logical inconsistency in the idea of a 'coincidence' between an objective law and a socially determined ideological tool. But it must at the same time be admitted that it is not *reasonable* to believe in such a coincidence. It is against any form of common sense or pure reason. If it is possible to show that some features of architecture have an ideological function, it seems rather strange to assume that the same features have an independent, objective function.

There is, in addition, a point which should not be forgotten. If, as we supposed, the theory is true, then architecture is, among all other things, a means to an end. It should then be evaluated as such, that is, either by its efficiency as a method (if we accept the end), or by reference to the value of the end. For instance, if we consider exploitation unjust, we get a moral reason to condemn architecture that aims to maintain it. In both cases we arrive at principles of evaluation that must be taken into account *even if* there were some additional objective principles of evaluation.

The only possibility to get rid of this ideologism is, then, to argue against the whole theory:

"It is clear that the principle cause of a building's erection and its style might lie, not in social or economic factors, but in men's apprehension of other cultural products. The

'superstructure' has an intrinsic power to generate and perpetuate itself, independently of the so-called 'base'. Anyone who doubts the point should consider the history of German music, and the enduring soul of German music as Schoenberg and Thomas Mann, in their different ways, attempted to describe it. And there is no better evidence of the autonomous life of the 'superstructure' than architecture itself, in which styles, buildings, towns and cities have risen and perpetuated themselves independently of their fluctuating economic circumstances. Consider, for example, the history of the Doric column, from the Parthenon to St. Katherine's dockyard. The fact is that all those aspects of architecture which we assign instinctively to the 'aesthetic' dimension of experience, everything short of the mere quantity of building undertaken, partake of the rich contingency implicit in every social act, and suggest a causality internal to the superstructure, a causality in which tradition and precedent are by far the most important factors." (Scruton, 1979, 153-154)

The force of this *Credo* by Scruton is unfortunately severely weakened by the fact that architecture is *overtly* a much more social phenomenon than, for instance, German music. Thus it is simply false to say that "the principal cause of a building's erection is not in social or economic factors" or that "towns and cities have risen and perpetuated themselves independently of their fluctuating economic circumstances". There is not a single building without specific economic and social purposes (without which these buildings would not exist), and any history of town-planning shows how deep and logical is the dependence between the life of towns and cities and their economic circumstances.

Furthermore, there is a specific danger that has been left totally unnoticed by Scruton. As we remember, one of the basic functions of the ideology is to hide itself. And where is this more important than in history, which has to be cleansed from all traces of economic determinancy, exploitation, and class-struggle. The result is what is called by Marxists 'historical idealism' as opposed to their own 'historical materialism'. This means that the course of history is explained by reference to individuals (rulers, politicians etc.) and their doings, or else to 'irrational forces' or even the 'spirit of history'. The parallel in the history of art is the traditional 'collection' of individual artists and works of art. Within this framework it is clear that every work and style can only be explained by reference to its predecessors. Hence the "causality internal to the superstructure".

Let us consider an example put forward by Scruton:

"-- [C]an we envisage a full-blooded Marxist criticism of the Gothic cathedral --? How would the Marxist distinguish the Gothic cathedral from the Romanesque -- how would he explain, for example, the arguments about the art of building which occurred in the wake of the first Cistercian style, and the polemics of St. Bernard of Clairvaux?" (Scruton, 1979, 154)

This is a good example, since it illustrates very well the basic difference between the idealist and the materialist conception of history. The traditional ways of explaining the transition from the Romanesque to the Gothic style are either theological (referring to the spiritual 'structure' of scholasticism and its being reflected in the Gothic cathedral) or architectural (referring to the new structural principles or to the aesthetic need for a 'great space').

Historical materialism, on the other hand, doesn't concentrate on the individual churches, and it is consequently in a position to find larger causes: the birth of the medieval city, which, on the other hand, meant the birth of a new social class, the bourgeoisie. This grew out of the merchants and handicraftsmen that

gathered near the castles (*Burg*). One of the marks of this growing social power was the Gothic cathedral, a masterwork of the handicraft, a precious ornament that was made possible by the city and its walls. It had to differ from, and beat, the Romanesque church representing the old nobility (and being by its style just like a noble castle).

This rudimentary analysis shows how it is possible to give two completely different explanations of an architectural style, depending on the basic assumptions of historical development. What this amounts to is that the history of architecture cannot be used as a counter-example against Marxism, since there is no 'pure' history, only different (and, if Marxism is true, ideological) interpretations of history.

We find ourselves, again, in the same situation: the only possibility is to see whether the socio-economic determinism behind Marxism is true. In this attempt, however, we do not have to choose between a 'yes' or a 'no'. On the contrary, it is of the utmost importance to consider *how far* this possible determinism reaches. In the case of architecture we have, between the extremes, at least the following alternatives: (1) the major part of the actual building is determined by the economic 'base', whereas architects are capable of forming an independent *avant-garde* in their designs, sometimes even in some erected buildings, (2) most architects are simply tools of the ruling class, whereas some individuals may fight their way out of it, perhaps even threaten the whole system with their writings and designs, (3) all architects are dependent on the 'base', but some of them may take part in the class-struggle and start a revolutionary style.

This question, by its nature both theoretical and empirical, is, naturally, too difficult and extensive for the present paper.

4. Conclusion: Designing of a New Morality

There is a certain dissonance in Scruton's aesthetics that has disturbed me throughout this commentary. By his nature he represents a rather traditional, even 'old-fashioned' view of architecture, which is clearly revealed in his *Credo* against Marxism. On the other hand, he wants to introduce into aesthetics concepts like 'morality' and 'aesthetics of everyday life', which are inherently alien to traditional aestheticism.

This dissonance should not find its way into the future aesthetics of architecture. It is not possible to get very far with this moral or social line of thought while retaining all the traditional views of art, architecture, and morality itself.

But how should we, then, locate our problems? Scruton's contention that we should not even try to see architecture as a 'pure' art, cleansed of all moral and social problems, is clearly justified. The necessary starting point in any theory of architecture is the realization that there is a social function peculiar to architecture, as opposed to painting, sculpture etc. By conceiving architecture as 'big sculpture' we would miss the whole point.

But a theoretical elaboration of this idea requires that we seriously attack the basic problems of ethics and moral and social philosophy. The first question is, naturally, the function of morality in society. The second is the function of morality

for the individual. The order is important here, since only in this way are we able to proceed without unjustified assumptions.

By so doing it is possible to show that morality can be explained as an essentially social phenomenon, and even functional as such. This would mean a radical (if not too original) shift from the traditional objectivist or absolutist position. In particular, it would mean that the individual conscience should be seen as a reflection of social morality, not as an independent phenomenon. This reflection is, however, by no means unimportant, since it is obviously part of the materials of human identity.

But if morality can be understood as a purely social phenomenon, what about ethics? These two concepts are often used as synonyms, but this fact is at least partly due to the traditional view of morality (taking moral laws as either objective laws or in any case laws within the subject). By ethics we may mean either a philosophical discipline or any conscious enterprise with the purpose of directing future action. Since man is in most cases faced with a number of alternatives (so that he may conceive of himself as a subject with more or less free will), he may rationally raise the question of direction.

Ethics, understood in this way, may indeed transcend social morality. This doesn't necessarily mean that questions about the justice of existing moral codes would make any sense (since justice is itself a moral concept and thereby subject to social determinancy). However, it is always possible to question existing moral codes, and even fight against them. This rational process we might call *critical* or *creative* ethics.

This is also the path open to architecture. It is not necessary for the architect to describe or realize in visual forms the existing moral codes (although they do determine his actual work in many respects). He may also locate himself among the makers of a new morality. In this way the normative content of his work would coincide with its social nature.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ALTHUSSER, L. (1970), *Idéologie et appareils idéologiques d'Etat* (Notes pour une recherche), *La Pensée*, **151** (1970), 3-38.
- BENEVOLO, L. (1975), "Storia della Città" (Laterza, Bari, Roma).
- BUZZONI, A., DE BENEDETTO, G., *et al.* (1979), "Il Patrimonio Storico Artistico" (Touring Club Italiano, Milano).
- CAMESASCA, E., Ed. (1968), "Storia della Casa" (Rizzoli, Milano).
- CURL, J. C. (1970), "European Cities and Society" (Leonard Hill Books, London).
- HEGEL, G. W. F. (1972), "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts" (Ullstein, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Wien).
- KORN, A. (1953), "History builds the town" (Humphries, London, Lund).
- MUMFORD, L. (1961), "The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations and Its Prospects" (Secker and Warburg, London).
- SCRUTON, R. (1974), "Art and Imagination. A Study in the Philosophy of Mind" (Methuen and Co. Ltd., London).
- SCRUTON, R. (1979), "The Aesthetics of Architecture" (Methuen and Co. Ltd., London).
- VAN DE VEN, C. (1978-1980), "Space in Architecture: The Evolution of a New Idea in the Theory and History of the Modern Movements" (Van Gorcum, Assen).