



Livos

Liquid-Federated Voting System

LIVOS : BACHELOR PROJECT PRESENTATION

BY ETIENNE BOISSON AND GUILLAUME TABARD


SUMMARY:

- Introduction (what is livos, usefulness, goal, challenges)
- Implementation (structure, website, simulations)
- Simulation (Survey, Circle, Tyrant, Markov, Quadratic Voting)
- Results (Liquid accuracy impact)
- Conclusion

INTRODUCTION : WHAT IS LIVOS ?

- Research project based upon Liquid Democracy
- Liquidity
- Delegation
- Proof of concept of E-voting system

Liquid Voting



- Split among many candidates.
- More precise way of voting


USEFULNESS OF THE PROJECT

- Major problem : not yet applied in real systems. (Digital Liquid Democracy)
- Theory is ready.
- Missing part : to provide more effort into working on a realist implementation of a Liquid Democratic voting system.




GOAL OF THE PROJECT

- Proof of Concept of integration of a Liquid system in «real» simulations
- Does Liquid Democracy bring major changes to the results ?
- Basis for future studies
- Comes with interrogations:
 - Circle delegation, Tyrant problems
 - Minorities and the balance of voting power



CHALLENGES


- Drop Security and federated aspect to mainly focus on the Liquid/Delegation part. (First ideas were too ambitious)
- Implementation of the liquid democracy :
 - more complex than traditional
 - simulating the behavior of a voter



Results : $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{Yes} = 100 + 125 \\ \text{No} = 75 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{Yes: } 75\% \\ \text{No: } 25\% \end{array}$

SIMULATION DESIGN

- Blank vote and abstention-vote
- Maximum number of actions
- Simulation rounding problems
- Transitivity of delegation




IMPLEMENTATION:

- Key words: VotingSystem, VotingInstance, VotingConfig, Users
- Server and web application : DEMONSTRATION
 - Tool that is implemented, ready to be used for a real (centralized) experiment.
- Simulations with the GraphViz library (see next slide)

Votation Diagram of 19 nodes. Results are : IC = 30 %,SV = 27.33 %,MECA = 20.67 %,MICRO = 22 %,
(generated: 2022-01-05 19:56:15.4160355 +0100 CET m=+0.003265301)

Il y a 3 CandidateVoter, 3 Threshold Voters, 1 NonResponsibleVoter, 4 ResponsibleVoter, 4 IndecisiveVoter and 0 NormalVoter





SIMULATION: SURVEY

- Objective : Categorize voters specific behaviors

- Run simulation with (limited) set of datas closest to the reality


- Urge to make Liquid Democracy popular



DIFFERENT VOTER CATEGORIES


And last but not least : Do you recognize yourself in one or more of the following categories (you can add a new category if you don't feel belonging to any) :

102 réponses



CIRCULAR DELEGATION PROBLEM

- Awareness of a cycle then take a decision (to break it).
- How ? Notification system : come back to the website to vote again



COULD WE AUTOMATE THIS PROCESS TO BE MORE USER-FRIENDLY ?




- Voters should fill in form to describe their behavior in various situations (situations, conditions, parameters change drastically the decisions)
- Fit people into categories doesn't always represent the reality and is in fact not more user-friendly
- Another path that : running simulations with preference lists

TYRANT PROBLEMS

- We might think that with the delegation process some tyrant with too much voting power can be created.
- Either by a chain of delegation:
 - broken by responsible votersAs they are as many chance to break the chain

Let's say there is a vote with 100 voters (included you) and each voter has an initial voting power of 100. The total system's voting power therefore equals 10.000. If 9 voters delegate their voting powers to you, you then have 10% of the total system's voting power. What would be, in percentage of the total system's voting power, the limit at which your choice starts to be seriously impacted, if any ?

102 réponses




TYRANT PROBLEMS

- If everyone delegates to one person :
 - seems unrealistic as you often delegates to someone different.

Let's say there is a situation where you know NOTHING about the subject of the votation and its implications and you don't have time to learn about it. What would be your top 3 actions ?

:

102 réponses



MARKOV CHAINS

- New result counting method:

Elect not the most voted candidate but the one that best suits the most people.

The liquidity = tool to count differently the results

- Example : Voter1 voted for 60% to A, 30% to B and 10% to C.

- Mathematical tool of Markov to solve this and get that B should be the winner.

- Vote 1: A,B,C

- Vote 2: A,B,C


- Vote 3: B,C,A

- Vote 4: C,B,A

LIQUID QUADRATIC VOTING:

- Another way of counting the results.
- Favors vote splitting and thus encourage liquidity.

Initial Voting Power : 10



$$C_1 : 10 + 2 = 12 \quad \textcircled{1}$$

$$C_2 : 4 + 3 = 7 \quad \textcircled{3}$$

$$C_3 : 4 + 3 = 7 \quad \textcircled{2}$$

with LQV : $x \rightarrow \sqrt{x}$

$$C_1 : \sqrt{10} + \sqrt{2} = 4,58 \quad \textcircled{2}$$

$$C_2 : \sqrt{4} + \sqrt{3} = 3,73 \quad \textcircled{3}$$


$$C_3 : \sqrt{4} + \sqrt{3} = 3,73 \quad \textcircled{1}$$

RESULTS :

- Liquid accuracy impact measured with :
 - Election with candidates
 - Referendums (yes/no)
 - Survey data (with and without Indecisive voters : blank vote)
 - Number of voters
 - Balanced / Unbalanced votes


LIQUID ACCURACY (ELECTIONS)

- Up to 20% precision loss when using a traditional system (stays almost constant due to indecisive voters : $\sim 19.5\%$)
- Without indecisive voters : 5%- 8% then drop of the accuracy (when adding voters)
- No difference between balanced and unbalanced elections



LIQUID ACCURACY (REFERENDUMS)

- Up to 18% precision loss when using a traditional system (stays almost constant due to indecisive voters)
- Without indecisive voters Balanced : 4% then drop of the accuracy (when adding voters)
- Non-balanced (2 sorts) : impact of accuracy stays constant (slight decrease $\sim 1\%$ loss from 100 to 10.000 voters)



LIQUID QUADRATIC VOTING

- Without indecisive voters : 2.7% then quick drop of the accuracy (when adding voters)
- With indecisive voters : 4.2% then quick drop of the accuracy.

Quadratic Impact 4 Candidates	Realist Data	Realist Data without Indecisive
Balanced (50 % each, and equal number of YesVoter and NoVoter)	100 voters : 4.27 % (1.000 simulations)	100 voters : 2.74 % (1.000 simulations)
	1000 voters : 1.40 % (100 simulations)	1000 voters : 0.86 % (200 simulations)
	10.000 voters : 0.41 % (4 simulations)	

- Strongly relative to the design of the system and our data.

CONCLUSION

- Liquid Democracy can be used in every democratic systems.
- People are more involved, the results can be up to 20% more accurate (under specific conditions)
- This project provides a system that implements Liquid Voting and provides different ways to interact with it as the website or the simulations.
- For the future, LIVOS project can be improved in many ways:
 - User-friendliness of the e-voting system, keep the balance between automation of the process and precision of the result with few solicitation of the user.
 - A Federated architecture
 - Security and usability of the web application thought proper authentication and remote access.
 - Display more information and give more options in the website to diverse the system.
 - More parameters to the simulations (such as the age of the participant...)

THANK YOU !



Livos

Liquid-Federated Voting System