


Firenet – PhD semester project


Jingyue Zhao

Supervisors: Prof. Bryan Ford, Prof. Katerina Argyraki


Network Management



Network Management



Network Management




Motivation

- **Long-term goal:** a **transparent** and **secure decentralized** network management scheme for large-scale networks.
- Decisions of each administrator → direct or indirect **impacts on other** parts of network.
- **Admins** can be **compromised** → disaster of the entire network.


System Model

- A **single small group of administrators** make **network policies** together.
- **Follower routers** correspond to **SDN controllers** which deploy the network policies.
- Each network policy needs to be checked and **approved by a threshold of admins** to avoid careless or malicious actions.



System Model


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How to make the
policy making
process
transparent and
secure?


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
Cothority

- Collective authority: a set of **witness** servers called **conodes** that **collectively execute decentralized protocols**
- Provide services: **collective signing** (CoSi [1]), Byzantine agreement, or generation of public-randomness



Cothority


Authoritative statements: e.g. log records



[1] Syta E, Tamas I, Visher D, et al. Keeping authorities" honest or bust" with decentralized witness cosigning[C]//Security and Privacy (SP), 2016 IEEE Symposium on. Ieee, 2016: 526-545.

Threat Model

- **Network administrators**: make and approve network policies
 - **Malicious**: propose or approve bad policies; only a threshold of admins can be compromised by an attacker
- **Cothority** (witness servers): check and track admins' policy making process
 - Honest
- **Follower routers**: pull and deploy the network policies periodically
 - Honest



Design of Firenet

Step 1: admins' approval



😊 Key 1

😊 Key 2

😊 Key 3



😊 Key 4

Admins





Design of Firenet

Step 1: admins' approval




Design of Firenet

Step 1: admins' approval




Design of Firenet

Step 1: admins' approval



Design of Firenet


Step 2: cothority's approval check and collective signing



For now, the check is done by one server in the cothority, and we can design a protocol to distribute the workload.

Design of Firenet


Step 2: cothority's approval check and collective signing (using CoSi [1])



[1] Syta E, Tamas I, Visher D, et al. Keeping authorities" honest or bust" with decentralized witness cosigning[C]//Security and Privacy (SP), 2016 IEEE Symposium on. Ieee, 2016: 526-545.


Design of Firenet

Step 2: cothority's approval check and collective signing



Design of Firenet






Step 3: cothority's appending the new policy to the chain (using Skipchain[2])



[2] Nikitin K, Kokoris-Kogias L, Jovanovic P, et al. CHAINIAC: Proactive Software-Update Transparency via Collectively Signed Skipchains and Verified Builds[J]. 2017.


Design of Firenet

Step 3: cothority's appending the new policy to the chain




Design of Firenet

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


Design of Firenet

Step 3: cothority's appending the new policy to the chain



Firenet in 1 slide



Network Policy Description Language

- Based on Linux iptables
- One network **policy consists of** several network **rules**
- One policy is self-sufficient
- JSON object

Network policy

Property	Value
Policy description	string
Number of network rules	int
An array of network rules	Network rule 1
	Network rule 2
	...
	Network rule n

Network rule


Property		Value
Matches	Chain	INPUT, OUTPUT, FORWARD
	Protocol	TCP, UDP, ICMP, ALL
	Source IP/network	x.x.x.x, x.x.x.x/x, ALL
	Source ports	Port number(s)
	Destination IP/network	x.x.x.x, x.x.x.x/x, ALL
	Destination ports	Port number(s)
Action		ACCEPT, DROP, REJECT

Implementation


- Firenet is implemented in Go
- Based on the Cothority framework, using CoSi and Skipchain
- 1.3kLOC
- Main functions with APIs
 - Genesis Policy Request
 - New Policy Request
 - Get Policy Request
 - Verify Policy Request

Evaluation

Testbed: 32-core Intel Xeon CPU at 2.6 GHz with 66GB of RAM (one server of IC cluster)



Maximum 0.18 sec for 100 admins




Maximum 20.8 sec for 128 conodes


Evaluation

Time cost component

Genesis policy CPU time component (50 admins, 128 conodes)




New policy CPU time component (50 admins, 128 conodes)



Compared to SDN

- Follower routers can be seen as SDN controllers
- Security-enhanced SDN application layer
- Easy to rollback to a previous correct network configuration



Future Work

- Performance evaluation & analysis
 - Tendency and limit
 - Bandwidth
 - Time cost vs number of policies
- Protocol improvement
 - Multiple groups of admins
 - Hierarchical network policy

Thank you!

Implementation

