



ÉCOLE POLYTECHNIQUE
FÉDÉRALE DE LAUSANNE

Forward-secrecy on POP

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Decentralized and Distributed Systems lab

Master Thesis – September 2017

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- **Online collaborative service (e.g. Wikipedia)**
- **Authenticate users anonymously against a list**
- **Link authentication attempts**
- **Other example: e-voting**

- **Introduction**
- **PoP and DAGA interaction**
- **Implementing DAGA**
- **Improving DAGA**
- **Conclusion & Future work**

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- **PoP: Proof of Personhood – DEDIS**
 - Creation of the user list
 - Authentication protocol
 - Anonymity within the group
 - No forward-secrecy
- **DAGA: Deniable Anonymous Group Authentication – Ewa Syta**
 - Authentication protocol
 - Forward-secrecy

Goals

- **Using DAGA as PoP's authentication protocol**
- **Implementing DAGA in Go**
- **Improving DAGA**




Key concepts

- **Anonymity**
 - No information about the user is known
- **Accountability**
 - The sender can be held responsible for his action
- **Linkability**
 - Two messages come from the same user
- **Forward-secrecy**
 - Breaking a session does not break the previous ones

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


Integration





PoP: How it works






PoP: Weaknesses

- **No forward-secrecy**
 - Tag derived from private key
 - Leakage allows to identify the user in previous sessions
 - **Cross-service de-anonymisation**
 - Tags independent from the service
 - Users can be tracked between different services
- **Loss of anonymity**



DAGA: How it works





- **Forward-secrecy**

- Tags derived from context elements only
- Private key used in client proof
- Proof does not leak information

- **Cross-service de-anonymisation**

- Different services → Different contexts

☐ Different tags for the same user

Conclusion

- **DAGA can solve PoP weaknesses**
- **DAGA and PoP can be interfaced**
- **E-voting**

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EPFL Implementation

- Go
- RSA ☐ Elliptic Curves
- Distributed randomness


$$T_0^i = h_i^{\left(\prod_{k=1}^m s_k\right)} \quad \text{?} \quad T_0^i = \left(\prod_{k=1}^m s_k\right) * H_i$$

Code results

- **Library: Complete implementation**
- **Test coverage 88%**
- **Example scenario**
- **Benchmark package**



Benchmarks: Communication




Setup:

- Windows 10
- x86-64
- 1 thread
- @4,5GHz

- No improvement
- No explanation yet



Benchmarks: Time



- Moore's law 2012 $\rightarrow$ 2018: $\sim /8$ from hardware
- Elliptic Curves


Conclusion

- **Complete implementation**
- **Time improvement**
- **Next step: Integrate it with PoP**

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Proof problem





Proof problem

- **Anonymity through a client OR proof:**
 - I know (private key 1 OR private key 2 OR ...)
- **Growth $O(6*n)$, $n = \text{\#members}$**
 - 32768 members / 32 servers
 - Proof ~6,3 MB, total cost ~200 MB → ~20% of total



Improving the proof

- **Work with Kasra Edalatnejadkhamene, PhD student**
- **Survey of the field**
- **Split the proof**
 - Proof of membership: Accumulator
 - Proof of knowledge: Signature of knowledge
- **No concrete scheme**


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Conclusion & Future work


- **DAGA and PoP can work together**
- **Complete Go implementation of DAGA**
- **Improvement guidelines for the proof**
- **Next steps**
 - Integrate DAGA and PoP
 - Optimize network consumption
 - Continue the work on the proof
 - Improve implementation resistance
(secure memory management, constant-time, ...)

Distributed randomness



- **User public keys (#members)**
- **Server public keys (#servers)**
- **Server random commitments (#servers)**
- **Client random generators (#members)**

- *Accumulators from Bilinear Pairings and Applications*
L. Nguyen, 2005
- **Adjustments:**
 - Trusted setup
 - Bounded
 - Efficiency based on trusted authority



- *How to Leak a Secret*, R. Rivest, A. Shamir and Y. Tauman